Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867–1918 (1994), pp. MacKean, New Perspectives, especially pp. Westwood, Russian Naval Construction, 1905–45 (1994), pp. For insight into Russian diplomats see ibid, pp. 50 per cent of Russia’s exports (1900s) with 75 per cent leaving via the Straits (p. Spring, ‘Russian foreign policy, economic interests and the Straits Question, 1905–14’, in R. Kent (ed.), The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (1984), Chapter 4 D. Bodger, ‘Russia and the end of the Ottoman Empire’, in M. Rieber, ‘Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy’, in H. 134 Lieven stresses the usual subordination of economic interests to national security. 91, notes the forces beginning to work against Tirpitz before 1911–12, but still sees those years as the turning point. (eds.), The Cambridge Modern History (1910), xii. John Lowe, The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Problem, 1865–1925 (1994), Chapter 5 judiciously examines the scholarly debate on the importance of weltpolitik. 141–2 for interesting comment on the use of imperialism in Germany to help unite the parties of the right and the centre also Chapters 3–7 passim. Mackay, Balfour: intellectual statesman (1985), p. Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (1926–38), ii. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power: British foreign policy, 1902–22 (1972), iii. See also Arden Bucholz, Molke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (1991), passim.Ĭ. 192–4 Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (1983), pp. Lieven, Nicholas II: emperor of all the Russias (1993), pp. James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (1984), pp. The Germans were taken aback by the speed with which the British broke the Hague Convention on private property.īernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: ideology, interest and sea power during the Pax Britannica (1986), p. 1 This was confirmed in the first year of the war when such restraint as accompanied the British blockade was inspired by the need to avoid giving offence to the Americans. As for the moves which led to the Declaration of London (1909) on neutral rights and contraband, key British policy-makers saw the ‘agreements … as mere words to be interpreted in the light of circumstances if Britain found herself a belligerent’. The Germans objected to anything that threatened their naval or military freedom of action. The British feared German plots to reverse their ententes with France and Russia, while the Austrians believed that Britain was bent on causing Germany the maximum of embarrassment. Even the visiting Americans were anxious to give no impression of weakness. The main participants, however, were interested at best in marginal additions to such constraints on war as already existed. It might have seemed a source of hope and encouragement when delegates assembled for the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 that the European powers should have avoided war among themselves for no less than 36 years.
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